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ABSTRACT The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict resolution process had expe-
rienced insurmountable deadlock due to the failure of the peace nego-
tiations brokered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, France, and 
the United States since the mid-1990s. The so-called Velvet Revolu-
tion of Armenia in 2018 was unable to deliver any progress, although 
a breakthrough was expected of, and promised by, the new leadership 
of the country. This, coupled with the constant provocations of the 
military and political leaders of Armenia, aggravated the conflict and 
led to the outbreak of an almost full-scale war on September 27, 2020. 
The war changed the status quo and created an environment for the 
negotiated resolution of the conflict following the establishment of 
a humanitarian ceasefire in Moscow. Armenia’s subsequent viola-
tions of the ceasefire regime by targeting Azerbaijani civilians have, 
however, demonstrated that peace is likely to remain an inaccessible 
dream of the region’s people in the short to medium term.
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Introduction
On the threshold of the disso-lution of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, a vio-
lent dispute broke out between Soviet 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, caused by 
a call from Armenian nationalists to 
carve out the Nagorno-Karabakh au-
tonomous region of Azerbaijan and 
unify it with Soviet Armenia. After 
the break-up of the Soviet Union, 
Armenia launched a full-scale mil-
itary operation against Azerbaijan 
in 1992-1994, which resulted in the 
occupation of almost twenty percent 
of Azerbaijan’s internationally recog-
nized territory. The occupied territo-
ries included the Nagorno-Karabakh 
region and seven adjacent districts of 
Azerbaijan. 
In 1993, the UN Security Council 
adopted four resolutions –822, 853, 
874, and 884– demanding the with-
drawal of Armenian troops from 
the occupied Azerbaijani territories. 
The resolutions reconfirmed the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region and the 
other occupied territories as part of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan. The mili-
tary hostilities persisted, however, af-
ter the adoption of these resolutions 
and a ceasefire was only reached in 
May 1994, through the mediation of 
Russia, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
The peace negotiations between the 
two parties to the conflict were en-
trusted to the mediation of the Con-
ference for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE), which was later re-
named the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
in line with a regional arrangement 
under Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter. Since the mid-1990s, the Minsk 
Group of the OSCE, an international 
mission including eleven states and 
co-chaired by the United States, Rus-
sia, and France, has coordinated the 
conflict resolution process and has 
offered a number of settlement for-
mulations in that time. 
The so-called “Basic Principles,” also 
known as the “Madrid Principles,” 
presented by the co-chair states of the 
Minsk Group in November 2017 in 
Madrid, Spain, held the highest po-
tential for an effective and peaceful 
resolution.1 According to this docu-
ment, the territories surrounding the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region are sup-
posed to return to Azerbaijan’s con-
trol. Nagorno-Karabakh will be given 
an interim status and provided with 
guarantees for security and self-gov-
ernance, while its final legal status 
will be determined later by a legally 
binding expression of will (i.e., a 
plebiscite). 
The international efforts to reach 
a resolution, however, failed to de-
liver a breakthrough owing to the 
consistent deconstructive moves of 
the Armenian government. Being 
interested in the prolongation of the 
status quo and consolidation of con-
trol over the occupied territories of 
Azerbaijan, the Armenian leaders 
refused to implement the principles. 
This aggravated the situation on the 
frontline, sporadically causing vio-
lent escalations (e.g., in April 2016), 
and minimized hopes for a peaceful 
settlement. 
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The change of government in mid-
2018 in Armenia initially generated 
marked optimism for an eventual 
breakthrough. This was caused not 
only by signals from the highest level 
of the Armenian government, but 
also by the relatively peaceful envi-
ronment on the front line. Unfortu-
nately, it was soon clear that Arme-
nia’s new government, headed by 
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, was 
abusing this process to consolidate 
its domestic control, as it soon revi-
talized extremist approaches relating 
to Armenia’s claim to the occupied 
territories of Azerbaijan. This policy 
approach, bolstered by the belliger-
ent rhetoric of Armenia’s military top 
brass, destroyed any possibility for 
a negotiated resolution and led the 
process toward the grievous escala-
tion on September 27, 2020. 
The False Promise of Armenia’s 
2018 Regime Change 
In the aftermath of the so-called 
Velvet Revolution of 2018, which 
brought Nikol Pashinyan to power 
in Armenia, a degree of optimism ar-
rived at the negotiating table. In con-
trast to his predecessors, Prime Min-
ister Pashinyan is not of Karabakh 
origin and is not associated with the 
war of the early 1990s. This was part 
of the reason that he was expected to 
show more constructivism with re-
gard to the peace negotiations. 
There were, indeed, a number of pos-
itive developments at the beginning 
of Pashinyan’s rule. In late 2018, the 
leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia 
agreed on the establishment of a tele-
phone hotline between the military 
commanders for the first time and, in 
January 2019, they agreed to take con-
crete measures to “prepare popula-
tions for peace.” According to recently 
declassified information, during this 
time the leaders of the two countries 
were also in private communication 
through the initiative of the Arme-
nian side.2 It has been leaked that Ar-
menia’s Prime Minister, Nikol Pashin-
yan, had indirectly communicated his 
desire to resolve the conflict through 
negotiations that took place secretly 
in an unspecified European country. 
This happened against the backdrop 
of a substantial decline in the number 
of casualty-causing incidents to just a 
handful in 2019.3 
The new situation in the conflict, on 
the one hand, indicated the impor-
tance of the political will for de-esca-
lation and, on the other hand, gener-
ated hope and favorable conditions for 
further agreements and an eventual 
breakthrough. Those expectations, 
unfortunately, did not become reality, 
as an abrupt volte-face of Prime Min-
ister Pashinyan caused a dramatic de-
According to recently 
declassified information, 
the leaders of the two 
countries were also in private 
communication through the 
initiative of the Armenian 
side
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terioration in the peace process and 
paved the way for new escalations. It 
later became clear that Pashinyan may 
have aimed for a degree of stability on 
the front line while he was busy with 
domestic power struggles. He soon 
abandoned his peace-building initia-
tives and demonstrated a more radi-
calized, nationalistic position towards 
the conflict.
First, in March 2019, Pashinyan and 
his government cast doubt on the in-
ternationally mediated negotiation 
process and attempted to change its 
format by bringing in representatives 
of the local regime in the occupied 
Karabakh region.4 This attempt was 
challenged not only by Azerbaijan, 
but also by the OSCE’s Minsk Group. 
It is important to recall that the found-
ing documents of the Minsk Confer-
ence, dated March 24, 1992, defined 
the two parties to the negotiation: 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Elected 
and other representatives from the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azer-
baijan will join the negotiation pro-
cess only after consultation with and 
consent from all parties. This formula 
implied that, given some progress in 
the talks, both communities of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region –Arme-
nian and Azerbaijani– would become 
involved, as clarified by the Minsk 
Group Chairman in a statement is-
sued on September 15, 1992. 
Armenia’s military leadership 
demonstrated an even more decon-
structive and markedly belligerent 
position. Addressing a meeting of 
the Armenian diaspora in New York 
in March 2019, Armenia’s Defense 
Minister, Davit Tonoyan, declared 
that Yerevan would use the formula 
“new war for new territories” instead 
of the formula “peace in exchange for 
territories” proposed by the media-
tors. According to him, this strategy 
“will rid Armenia of this trench con-
dition, the constant defensive state, 
and will add the units which may 
shift the military actions to the ter-
ritory of the enemy.”5 Tonoyan made 
this statement immediately after 
the OSCE-mediated meeting of the 
Prime Minister of Armenia with the 
President of Azerbaijan in Vienna, 
which resulted in a joint statement 
on the need to create a favorable en-
vironment for peace and the adop-
tion of results-oriented steps in the 
negotiation process to find a peaceful 
settlement to the conflict. 
An extremist position was also taken 
by the Armenian Prime Minister 
who, in August 2019, in his address 
at the opening ceremony of the 
Pan-Armenian games that were held 
illegally in Khankandi, part of the 
Having caused dramatic 
frustration amongst 
Azerbaijanis, such 
provocations, coupled with 
growing militarization on 
the Armenian side, left no 
chance for the resolution of 
the conflict at the negotiation 
table
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Armenian-occupied internationally 
recognized territories of Azerbaijan, 
called for unification between Arme-
nia and Karabakh, declaring “Kara-
bakh is Armenia, period.”6 Breaking 
with the tradition of former Arme-
nian governments that had previ-
ously denied Yerevan’s control over 
the occupying regime established 
in the Nagorno-Karabakh region 
of Azerbaijan, he put the essence of 
the entire peace effort into question. 
Even Sergey Lavrov Foreign Minister 
of Russia, Armenia’s ally within the 
Collective Security Treaty Organiza-
tion (CSTO), reacted to Pashinyan’s 
speech and highlighted that such 
statements “do not help the settle-
ment of the conflict.”7
In spite of this, there was no major 
international pressure on the Ar-
menian government to refrain from 
provocative and dangerous rhetoric 
and participate constructively in the 
negotiations. Quite the contrary; the 
absence of an international back-
lash emboldened Prime Minister 
Pashinyan to completely derail the 
negotiations. In April 2020, his gov-
ernment denied the existence of any 
documents on the negotiating table, 
thereby rejecting all the efforts of the 
OSCE’s Minsk Group, including the 
Madrid Principles.8 
Armenia declared this in response to 
the remarks of Russian Foreign Min-
ister Sergey Lavrov about the peace 
negotiations between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Addressing a videocon-
ference organized by the Gorcha-
kov Public Diplomacy Fund, Lavrov 
expressed support for the existing 
“firmly established format of negoti-
ations” and described the draft doc-
uments on the agenda to be a “very 
important step in implementing the 
A site hit by a 
missile launched 
by the Armenian 
army in Ganja, 
Azerbaijan on 





more than 40 
others injured.
LOKMAN AKKAYA /  
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[United Nations] Security Council 
resolutions.”9 This caused particular 
concern in Armenia as the resolu-
tions of the UN Security Council, ad-
opted in 1993, demand the immedi-
ate withdrawal of Armenian military 
forces from the occupied territories 
of Azerbaijan. 
A month later, in yet another provoc-
ative move, the Armenian side held 
an inauguration ceremony, with 
Prime Minister Pashinyan present, 
for the new so-called president of 
the local regime in the city of Shu-
sha in occupied Nagorno-Karabakh 
–a place of deep cultural significance 
to Azerbaijanis. Having caused dra-
matic frustration amongst Azerbai-
janis, such provocations, coupled 
with growing militarization on the 
Armenian side, left no chance for the 
resolution of the conflict at the nego-
tiation table. 
Against this background, Azerbai-
jan began to express more loudly its 
dissatisfaction with the international 
mediation, thereby underscoring the 
potential ramifications of Armenia’s 
provocations for peace and security 
in the entire region. On July 6, in one 
of his last media appearances before 
the Tovuz clashes, Azerbaijani Pres-
ident Ilham Aliyev openly criticized 
the international mediators in the 
negotiations, declaring that the peace 
process had become “meaningless.”10 
These concerns did not receive much 
international attention, which en-
couraged Armenia to organize sys-
temic attacks against Azerbaijan on 
both the state border and in the oc-
cupied Nagorno-Karabakh region. 
Tovuz Clashes: Harbinger of a 
Bigger War
On July 12-15, 2020, the conflict be-
tween Armenia and Azerbaijan esca-
lated into a major military confronta-
tion along the state border straddling 
Azerbaijan’s Tovuz and Armenia’s Ta-
vush regions. The clashes, involving 
heavy artillery as well as aerial drones, 
resulted in the deaths of several mil-
itary personnel and civilians along 
with the destruction of infrastructure 
in the border region. The attack –di-
rectly along the state border between 
the two rival South Caucasus neigh-
bors– was a deliberate move by the 
Armenian side to lay the ground for 
the involvement of the Moscow-led 
CSTO in the conflict. 
Notably, any hostilities in the Kara-
bakh region itself or the surrounding 
Armenian-occupied areas do not fall 
under the jurisdiction of the alliance 
owing to the status of this area as part 
of Azerbaijan’s internationally recog-
nized territories. In an attempt to in-
voke Article 4 of the CSTO Charter, 
which designates an attack on a mem-
ber state as an attack against all mem-
bers, Armenia’s Foreign Minister, 
Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, held a phone 
conversation with CSTO Secretary 
General Stanislav Zas. A few hours 
after their talks, the secretary general 
announced an emergency meeting of 
the organization; however, that meet-
ing was soon postponed indefinitely, 
for unknown reasons.
A plan to sever the connection be-
tween Azerbaijan and Europe was 
also assumed by some observers as 
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part of the motivation leading to the 
July clashes.11 Importantly, Azerbai-
jan’s Tovuz district, where the clashes 
took place, is a region that hosts ma-
jor energy pipelines (the Baku-Tbili-
si-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South-
ern Gas Corridor) and transporta-
tion routes (the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars 
railway and the East-West Transport 
Corridor) connecting Azerbaijan 
with Europe through Georgia and 
Turkey. Any instability in this part 
of Azerbaijan would deal a serious 
blow to its connection with its West-
ern partners, with overarching con-
sequences for both sides. Therefore, 
the potential role of some third par-
ties who oppose the rise of Western 
influence in the South Caucasus in 
the recent escalation on the border is 
also an assumption deserving serious 
attention.
Although the clashes in Tovuz 
calmed down quickly, an increased 
militarization of Armenia was ob-
served in its aftermath. This was re-
flected in both the inflow12of arms to 
Armenia from third countries and 
the country’s formation of a mili-
tia of 100,000 female and male vol-
unteers aged up to 70.13 There were 
reports about the shipment of tons 
of weapons from Russia to Armenia 
in the wake of the Tovuz escalation. 
The Azerbaijani government was not 
convinced by Russia’s explanation 
that it was merely “construction ma-
terials” inside the aircraft that passed 
through the complex transporta-
tion routes, as the shortest route via 
Georgia was unavailable thanks to 
the principled position of the Geor-
gian government. 
This was accompanied by the re-
sumption of the illegal settlement of 
Armenians based in foreign countries 
in the occupied territories of Azer-
baijan. A day after the catastrophic 
explosion in Beirut, Lebanon, on 
August 4, 2020 Arayik Harutyunyan, 
the leader of the occupying forces in 
Karabakh, declared that they were 
ready to receive 100-150 Armenian 
families.14 Later, speaking at an Au-
gust 25, 2020 meeting devoted to 
assistance programs to Lebanese-Ar-
menians, Harutyunyan declared that 
his administration would “welcome 
and provide housing to all […] com-
patriots who wish to move” to Kara-
bakh.15 Armenia’s illegal settlements 
in the occupied territories, which vi-
olate the Geneva Convention of 1949, 
aim at the consolidation of control 
over the region and the creation of a 
fait accompli for future negotiations.
These were the major signals of an 
upcoming war between the two 
countries. On September 19, 2020 
President Aliyev of Azerbaijan 
The day after the agreement 
on the humanitarian ceasefire, 
Azerbaijan was shocked 
by a missile attack by the 
armed forces of Armenia 
against a densely-populated 
civilian settlement in Ganja, 
Azerbaijan’s second largest 
city, at 2 AM
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warned that Armenia was “preparing 
for a new war[…] concentrating their 
forces near the line of contact[…] We 
follow their actions. Of course, we 
will defend ourselves.”16 Armenia’s 
sudden attack in the early morning of 
September 27, 2020 along the line of 
contact demonstrated that President 
Aliyev was right in his precautions. 
Azerbaijan was again under shelling 
from the armed forces of Armenia.
Second Karabakh War and Its 
Implications
Towards the end of September, less 
than three months after the border 
clashes of July 12-15, 2020 the con-
flict between Armenia and Azer-
baijan escalated into the largest and 
most intensive military confrontation 
since the establishment of the Rus-
sia-brokered ceasefire in May 1994.
On September 27, Armenia’s armed 
forces started a large-scale provoca-
tion and fired at Azerbaijani army 
positions and civilian settlements in 
the front-line zone with large-caliber 
weapons, mortars and artillery of var-
ious calibers at about 6 AM. Azerbai-
jan’s Ministry of Defense, in response, 
launched a counter-offensive opera-
tion involving troops along the entire 
front to suppress the combat activity of 
the armed forces of Armenia and en-
sure the safety of the civilian popula-
tion. Both sides immediately invoked 
a general or partial mobilization and 
took the necessary measures for a lon-
ger period of intense confrontation. 
A protest against 
Armenia’s cross-
border attacks 
and in support of 
Azerbaijan was 
staged in front of 
the United Nations 
Office in Geneva, 
Switzerland on 
October 29, 2020.
BAYRAM ALTUĞ / AA
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE HELD FOREVER: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK IN THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT
2020 Fall 107
The war in the military field stretched 
over into the information space as 
well. From the outset of hostilities, 
the Armenian side disseminated a 
stream of disinformation for various 
purposes. Most importantly, attempt-
ing to invoke the collective defense 
article of the CSTO, Armenia accused 
Azerbaijan of targeting an Armenian 
fighter jet inside Armenian territory. 
Outraged by the political support of 
Turkey for Azerbaijan, they claimed 
that Azerbaijan had used a Turkish 
F-16 aircraft to target Armenia’s SU-
25. However, these attempts proved 
futile, as the CSTO did not react to 
them, and the hostilities remained 
local and fell short of evolving into 
a regional war between Russia and 
Turkey. 
According to the official statistics pro-
vided by the respective sides as of Oc-
tober 14, the Armenian side has lost 
more than 500 military servicemen 
while Azerbaijan has lost at least 43 
civilians (no information about mili-
tary casualties was reported by Azer-
baijan’s defense ministry). In its coun-
teroffensive, Azerbaijan has been able 
to liberate some strategic positions in 
its occupied territories including the 
Jabrail region, the Hadrut, and Suq-
ovushan (Madagiz) settlements, and 
several small villages. 
The international calls for an imme-
diate ceasefire and a return to ne-
gotiations did not affect the conflict 
until October 9, when the foreign 
ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia 
met in Moscow at the initiative and 
through the mediation of the Russian 
government. As a result of the ten-
hour talks, the sides agreed on the es-
tablishment of a humanitarian cease-
fire and the restart of negotiations on 
the basis of “Basic Principles.” The 
agreement also included a clause on 
the format of the negotiations that 
reaffirmed the existing format and 
thus rejected the demands of the Ar-
menian government about the repre-
sentation of the occupying regime in 
Karabakh in the negotiations. 
The day after the agreement on the 
humanitarian ceasefire, Azerbaijan 
was shocked by a missile attack by 
the armed forces of Armenia against 
a densely-populated civilian settle-
ment in Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second 
largest city, at 2 AM. The attack was 
perpetrated from the territory of Ar-
menia, that is, not from the occupied 
territories of Azerbaijan, and killed at 
least ten civilians while leaving many 
others, including women and chil-
dren, wounded.
Conclusion
The protraction of the peace negoti-
ations between Armenia and Azer-
baijan against the backdrop of the 
There was a belief that any 
military move by Azerbaijan to 
liberate its occupied territories 
would entail a Russian 
backlash that Baku would not 
dare face
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absence of international pressure on 
Yerevan to abide by international 
law and the resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council had appar-
ently assured the Armenian leaders 
that their control over the occupied 
territories would remain unchal-
lenged in the years to come. Relying 
on the security assurances within the 
CSTO, not only did the country start 
to mock the negotiations, but it also 
sought to consolidate the status quo 
and build new settlements in the oc-
cupied territories. There was a belief 
that any military move by Azerbai-
jan to liberate its occupied territories 
would entail a Russian backlash that 
Baku would not dare face. 
This was the reason why the Arme-
nian government challenged Azer-
baijani people’s limits of the patience 
through constant provocations. By 
shouting “Karabakh is Armenia, pe-
riod,” denying the existence of any 
document on the negotiating table 
and thus rejecting the Madrid princi-
ples, holding a so-called inauguration 
ceremony for the leader of the occu-
pying regime in Shusha, a historic 
Azerbaijani town, planning to move 
the “capital” of the occupational re-
gime to Shusha, adopting a military 
doctrine announcing “new war for 
new territories,” and so on, the Arme-
nian government derailed the nego-
tiations and caused new escalations. 
The second Karabakh war came hard 
on the heels of these developments. 
Emboldened by its defense pact with 
the CSTO and the military deliveries 
from Russia in the wake of the Tovuz 
clashes, Armenia attacked the posi-
tions of the Armed Forces of Azer-
baijan with the apparent objective of 
implementing Defense Minister Da-
vit Tonoyan’s “new war for new ter-
ritories” strategy. Quite contrary to 
Armenia’s expectations, thus far Rus-
sia has refused to become militarily 
involved in the conflict, referring to 
the fact that the clashes did not occur 
in the territories of Armenia and, as 
such, are not covered by the collective 
defense commitments of the CSTO. 
The active phase of the war was sup-
posed to end on October 10, 2020 in 
accordance with the Moscow agree-
ment between the foreign ministers 
of Armenia and Azerbaijan medi-
ated by the foreign minister of Rus-
sia. However, the attack by the armed 
forces of Armenia against the civilian 
settlement of Ganja city in Azerbai-
jan and the subsequent violation of 
the humanitarian ceasefire by the 
Armenian side demonstrate that the 
ceasefire is fragile and it will not be 
possible to achieve peace unless Ar-
menia abandons its territorial claims 
and accepts the supremacy of inter-
national law. 
The active phase of the 
war was supposed to end 
on October 10, 2020 in 
accordance with the Moscow 
agreement between the 
foreign ministers of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan mediated by 
the foreign minister of Russia
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